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Abstract— Service composition is a key concept of Service-
Oriented Architecture that allows for combining loosely coupled 
services that are offered and operated by different service 
providers. Such environments are expected to dynamically 
respond to changes that may occur at runtime, including changes 
in the environment and individual services themselves. Therefore, 
it is crucial to monitor these loosely-coupled services throughout 
their lifetime. In this paper, we present a novel framework for 
monitoring services at runtime and ensuring that services behave 
as they have promised. In particular, we focus on monitoring non-
functional properties that are specified within an agreed security 
contract. The novelty of our work is based on the way in which 
monitoring information can be combined from multiple dynamic 
services to automate the monitoring of business processes and 
proactively report compliance violations. The framework enables 
monitoring of both atomic and composite services and provides a 
user friendly interface for specifying the monitoring policy. We 
provide an information service case study using a real composite 
service to demonstrate how we achieve compliance monitoring. 
The transformation of security policy into monitoring rules, which 
is done automatically, makes our framework more flexible and 
accurate than existing techniques. 
Index Terms— Service-Oriented Computing, Composite 
services, Business process compliance, Compliance monitoring, 
Security. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) allows software 
components from different providers to be exported as services 
for external use. A service itself is a unit that offers a certain 
functionality. If no single service can satisfy the functionality 
required by the user, then SOA allows multiple services to be 
combined to form a larger application to fulfil the user 
requirements. A SOA platform provides a foundation for 
modeling and composing multiple services in an “ad-hoc” 
manner. Service descriptions are published by service 
developers and used by the potential users to discover services. 
A service composer is a service provider that is responsible for 
constructing service compositions and offering them to 
consumers. Service discovery is based on matching user 
requirements and security needs with the published service 
descriptions. Typically, service composers will have different 
needs and different requirements. They have varying business 
goals and different expectations from a service; for example, in 
terms of functionality, quality of service and security needs. 
Thus, it is important to make sure that a service should deliver 
what it promises and should match the user’s expectations. 
However, SOA-based applications are highly dynamic and 
liable to change heavily at runtime. These applications are made 
out of services that are deployed and run independently, and may 
change unpredictably after deployment. Thus, changes may 
occur to services after deployment and at runtime, which may 
lead to a situation where services fail to deliver what has been 
promised. Traditional verification techniques cannot foresee all 
of these changes as they are mainly pre-deployment activities. 
These challenges call for more effective approaches towards 
runtime monitoring of services [1][2][3][4][5][6]. 
Service composition can be viewed in a process-oriented 
perspective. This makes the composition not only easy to 
understand but also the composition can be validated against the 
desired rules and modified to suit the required operation. In a 
process-oriented approach, service composition is described by 
means of workflow languages and technologies. The workflow 
composition defines the operations to invoke and the execution 
order of the invocations [7]. A de-facto standard Business 
Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [8] are widely used as a 
modeling notation for business processes [9].  
This paper focuses on our monitoring framework that is 
based on the runtime monitoring of a service to ensure that the 
service behaves in compliance with a predefined security policy. 
We mainly concentrate on monitoring service behavior 
throughout the service execution lifetime to ensure that services 
behave as promised. Alerts regarding policy violations are sent 
as notifications. Current monitoring methods applied to service 
execution environments focus on generating alerts for a specific 
set of pre-built event-types. The dynamic nature of SOAs also 
extends to the end-user security requirements. An ideal system 
might allow different users to be awarded the opportunity to 
apply their own security policies enforced through a 
combination of design time and runtime checks. This might be 
the case even where multiple users are accessing the same 
services simultaneously. The main contribution of our 
framework is the focus on monitoring composite services and 
checking their workflow, invoked sub-services, compound 
properties, etc.  
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It also allows different user-specified policies to be monitored 
simultaneously at runtime with the accuracy of a monitoring 
system that links directly into the service execution 
environment. Thus, the framework has the capability not only to 
reveal the information predefined by the provider, but also to be 
configured to allow users to specify the monitoring rules (using 
the properties the service has to comply with). Finally, taking 
into consideration the limitation of any formal-based 
enforcement approach, we provide a possibility to add custom 
property checks for atomic services. These property checks can 
be added to our framework without any modification of the 
formal semantics of the language (ConSpec) and the monitoring 
service itself. Due to this we can monitor a much wider set of 
properties allowed by the formal language while still enjoying 
its advantages. 
The preliminary design of the monitoring framework and the 
event model have been described in a previous work [10][11]. 
This paper amends and extends the monitoring framework, 
addresses its limitations, and evaluates its performance. In the 
previous work, the monitoring framework was based on the use 
of Complex Event Processing (CEP). It used one language for 
requirements specification, ConSpec [12], and another one, 
Drools Fusion [13], for monitoring these requirements. One 
major limitation of previous work was a missing transformation 
engine required to translate requirement specifications into 
monitoring rules. The monitoring rules were defined manually 
through an external interface. This introduced a lot of 
complexities, particularly for dynamically changing service 
compositions, which indicated the need for an automated 
operation. The work presented in this paper uses one language 
for the requirement specification and the actual monitoring. This 
provides a seamless and uniform approach to service 
monitoring.  Our contribution in this paper differs from the 
existing work, e.g. [10], as follows: 
• A new approach has been proposed where only one 
language (ConSpec) has been used for both the 
requirements specification and monitoring rules. The 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) is developed as a part of the 
monitoring framework, which helps in translating 
ConSpec policies into monitoring rules and decision-
making. 
• The ConSpec policies can be used for expressing temporal 
properties spawning across several atomic services 
participating in a service composition. Moreover, they can 
include meta-properties such as restricting the service 
provider. 
• The monitoring framework is developed as a software 
module and allows straightforward integration with other 
modules or platforms.  
• We focus on monitoring non-functional properties (i.e., 
properties related to security and trust) that are specified 
within an agreed security contract. An information 
composite service case study (based on real services) has 
been used to demonstrate the compliance monitoring with 
a focus on two composite security properties. 
• A ConSpec editor has been developed which provides a 
graphical user interface for making and changing ConSpec 
policies. 
• The paper presents an in-depth performance evaluation to 
show that our system is well-suited for highly dynamic 
service compositions, which were missing in the previous 
work. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes a motivating service composition example. A 
discussion of the policy language is presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 describes the event model we propose for the 
monitoring framework. Our proposed monitoring framework is 
explained in Section 5. Sec. 6 describes the implementation of 
the proposed monitoring framework. Section 7 describes the 
assessment of the monitoring framework using a case study. 
Section 8 presents an in-depth performance evaluation to show 
that our system is well-suited for highly dynamic service 
compositions. Section 9 compares our approach with existing 
work and Section 10 concludes the paper and indicates the 
direction of our future work. 
II. SECURE SERVICE COMPOSITION: AN EXAMPLE  
We will illustrate our approach by using a running example. 
Fig. 1 presents an overview of the InfoService case study. In this 
example, we assume a small company that designs, develops, 
and provides customized services to customers. We also assume 
that customers want to have an application that provides a 
location-based information service, e.g., based on the current 
GPS coordinates of a mobile device or after entering an address. 
The application should display information such as the current 
weather or a map highlighting various Points of Interest (PoI). 
As there are many services available that already provide 
such information, it is a quite natural approach to building this 
new application based on already existing services, e.g.: 
1. A GeoCoding type service, which takes a street address 
as input and produces the associated geographical 
coordinates; 
2. A PointOfInterest type service that takes geographical 
coordinates (output of GeoCoding service) as input and 
returns the places that the end user can be interested in; 
3. A WeatherForecast type service that takes as input the 
geographical coordinates and returns the information 
about the weather predictions at the closest location to 
the end user; 
4. A Map type service that takes potential places of 
interests originated by (2) as input and returns a map 
showing the position and distance of the end user to 
each of these places; 
5. A WebPageInfoCollector type service takes a set of 
information related to a location gained from (3) and 
(4) as input, and returns a Web page that shows it. 
 
 
 
The resulting composite service is named InfoService. Each 
service in the InfoService composition is bound to a real Web 
Service running in the background and registered with a 
Marketplace (e.g., Aniketos Marketplace [14]). After providing 
the street address of the user as input, the composite service 
returns a Web page with some information related to the user’s 
location. 
       Operating even such a simple service composition raises 
already a number of security (e.g., data privacy, access control, 
see Brucker, et al. [15] for a more detailed discussion), 
trustworthiness (e.g., customers may trust different service 
parties of a service composition to a different extend, see 
Elshaafi et al. [16] for a more detailed discussion), reliability 
(i.e., services should deliver correct results), and availability 
(e.g., services should always be available) concerns. 
In our example, customers usually consider revealing their 
current locations as a privacy violation. Thus, the GPS 
coordinates should only be transferred to the services that 
actually require such information for their operation. Moving 
one step further, we see that the WeatherForecast requires an 
approximation of the location (e.g., the city), while the 
PointOfInterest service and Map service need the precise 
location for producing more accurate and precise results. 
Secondly, the service provider might need a separation of duty 
of the PointOfInterest service and WeatherForecast service to 
prevent fraud. In other words, a malicious provider offering both 
the PointOfInterest and WeatherForecast services could 
deliberately predict bad weather conditions for certain areas 
(i.e., to harm it financially); hence, convinces users to visit 
different places. Consequently, this threatens the repudiation of 
the composed WebPageInfoCollector. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Overview of InfoService Components. 
 
These requirements need to be considered during the entire 
lifecycle of the service composition (i.e., from the requirements 
engineering, to the development, to the operation of the 
application). Service composition based applications are highly 
dynamic. Thus, specification and runtime enforcement of 
security properties is not sufficient [17]. The security, 
trustworthiness, reliability, and availability of atomic services as 
well as composed services need to be monitored constantly and, 
depending on the observations, necessary actions need to be 
taken. For example, if the monitoring shows evidence that the 
trustworthiness of a service falls below a certain threshold, a 
dynamic re-composition should replace this service with another 
service of a similar kind that satisfies the required 
trustworthiness level.  
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III. POLICY LANGUAGE 
We need a suitable policy language to specify what we need 
to monitor. In general, this language should serve for other 
purposes as well, e.g., it should specify the security requirements 
for a service (either desired by a consumer or advertised by a 
service provider). Naturally, we may use one language for 
requirements specification and another one for monitoring these 
requirements (as it is done in Asim et al. [10]). In this case, there 
is a need for a transformation engine between these languages. 
Thus, one language for both purposes significantly reduces the 
complexity [18].  
 
We were looking for a language which could: 
• Express security properties and policies for hierarchical 
services; 
• Be expressive enough, clear and simple in processing at 
the same time; 
• Be generated by both humans and software; 
• Be able to express complex (security and privacy) policies; 
• Be used for requirements specification, matching, 
monitoring and reasoning. 
We considered several candidates, that are exploited by 
current state of the art frameworks such as WS02 
(https://www.ws02.com), for such kind of language. XACML 
[19] is a general-purpose policy language, but it is deemed cruel 
to write policies with it and to reason about them. Moreover, we 
will need to use the constraint part of policies in a nonstandard 
way. Event Calculus [20] is suitable for runtime monitoring and 
representing policies in a dynamic environment. On the other 
hand, the syntax of the language becomes too complex for 
compound services. Furthermore, considerable effort is required 
to automate generation and runtime monitoring of such policies. 
The PROTUNE [21] language has high expressivity and can be 
used to specify complex policies in a distributed environment. 
The main disadvantages of the method relates to its strength. 
Because of such enormous expressivity the language is complex 
for policy writing and reasoning.  
Based on the above analysis, we select the ConSpec 
language for our purposes. The ConSpec language has been 
proposed by the University of Trento (UNITN) and Royal 
Institute of Technology (KTH) in the scope of the Security of 
Software and Services for Mobile Systems (S3MS) project [22]. 
Briefly, we can see the language as follows1: 
The tag RULE ID defines the id of the policy. The tag SCOPE 
specifies whether the rule is applied to one specific execution or 
to all executions of the service. The tag SECURITY STATE defines 
the global variables and their initial values. Then, several events 
are checked BEFORE or AFTER occurrence.  
If an event occurred, we check guards one by one until we 
find the one that is satisfactory. In this case, certain security 
updates are performed. If no guards are fired for the event, then 
the further execution is not permitted (and some further security 
actions, like notifying the customer, are triggered). In case no 
security updates are needed but the further execution is allowed, 
there is a special action “skip”, which does not do anything but 
continues the execution. There is also a possibility of specifying 
an ELSE statement for the cases, when the further execution 
should be allowed even if no guards are fired2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: The Concrete Syntax of ConSpec. 
 
The ConSpec language can be straightforwardly mapped to 
the ConSpec automata. This automata can be seen as A = (Q, T, 
δ, q0), where Q is a set of states and q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, T 
is a set of actions, and δ is a (partial) transition function δ : Q × 
T → Q. A state can be seen simply as a specific assignment to 
the variables defined in the SECURITY STATE part. Naturally, the 
assignment defined in the SECURITY STATE part defines q0. 
Actions are defined by the guarded events (specified between 
BEFORE, AFTER, and PERFORM), i.e., by the name of the event 
(class and method), the set of its parameters and possible 
assignments for these parameters (in the AFTER case also the 
results of the event are considered). Finally, the (partial) 
transition functions join states with the parameters which fire 
some of the specified guards and the states which are received 
after the application of the corresponding updates. 
There are a number of advantages of ConSpec. First, this 
language was developed for security purposes and allows 
guarding possible actions performed by a system. It represents 
behavior in terms of different events that allow policies to be 
checked at runtime. Policy written in ConSpec has a 
comparatively simple semantics, and is simple to learn. 
ConSpec is an automata-based language. Although this 
feature slightly reduces its expressiveness (in comparison with 
its predecessor PSLan Erlingsson [23], or other declarative 
languages as EventCalculus [20], XACML [19], PROTUNE 
[21], etc.), however, this feature allows automatic reasoning on 
it. Thus, ConSpec permits defining complex policies, which are 
necessary to specify security requirements, and provides an 
efficient way to check them. In other words, next to simple value 
checking policies (e.g., verifying that the trustworthiness level 
of a service is higher than some threshold), ConSpec is devised 
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to monitor complex logical constructions (i.e., security policies) 
without the need for an additional layer of logical verification. 
In addition, ConSpec provides the embedded facility to evaluate 
properties before/after the monitored events, which is required 
particularly by Application security to prevent potentially 
malicious events from happening. Furthermore, the language is 
straightforward to define a policy decision point for monitoring 
purposes if an automaton is available. Also, ConSpec defines 
different scopes of its application. Thus, we may define a policy 
for a single execution of a service or multiple executions. 
Being based on basic programming and logical rules, 
ConSpec is an easy to learn language. Nevertheless, for most 
common applications, the details could be even hidden from the 
policy maker: an expert may define a template for a policy (i.e., 
a ConSpec Rule, where only initial Security State should be 
instantiated) and users will be required to simply provide the 
required input. This capability is very important for services, 
where the same security policy could be applied to any service 
for some hierarchical piece of business process: the only thing 
to be done is to instantiate the same selected template for low 
level services. 
IV. EVENT MODEL 
The monitoring framework we propose is built around the 
concept of events. It is an event-driven approach that allows the 
monitoring system to analyze events and react to certain 
situations as they occur. Any viable monitoring system must 
have the ability to analyze and identify the correct events in a 
timely manner. Fig. 3 displays a simplified version of our 
proposed event model. This organizes different event types 
allowing us to reason about and provide a generic way to deal 
with them.  
Event Listeners are embedded into the BPMN specifications 
which are triggered by events during workflow execution.   
These listeners can be configured at the Process level, Activity 
level or Transition level to generate events. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Event Model. 
 
Our event model is based on two types of process variables; 
Base Variables and Domain Specific Variables. Both types of 
variable are available during the execution of a business process 
and could be used for monitoring. The listeners have access to 
these process variables and can create events populated using 
their associated values, sending for analysis. The Base Variables 
inherit common attributes from the process itself, e.g., the 
process ID, process name, activity ID, activity name, process 
start time, etc. However, the Domain Specific Variables, 
declared in the SECURITY STATE section of ConSpec rules, 
are user defined and may build upon the Base Variables. For 
example, to analyse the load on a particular service, we could 
accumulate all start processing events for that service over the 
last hour. An alert message should be generated if the number of 
requests is more than a threshold value in the last hour. This 
threshold value is a user-defined attribute falling within the 
Domain Specific Variables. 
In the following discussion, we try to determine the structure 
of events that should be received for analysis. In our proposed 
framework, an overall process represents a composite service 
and an activity represents a service component. Fig. 4 shows an 
example of events for the InfoService BPMN process executed 
in a specific order. 
In this example, the InfoService BPMN process comprises 
five service tasks each with a Start and End event. The 
monitoring of an activity may need only the process ID, activity 
start and end events. The selection of start and end events for 
listening is determined by the nature of the monitor. With such 
events we can aggregate the data received so far and analyze it 
before (after) execution of a specific activity. Thus, we can 
prevent invocation of a service if it potentially can violate the 
contract. Then, the alarm rule is fired and appropriate reaction 
may be carried out, e.g., change the service fulfilling the activity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Event Flow. 
 
In our proposal, an event structure describes the data and 
structure associated with an event. It helps in organizing the data 
that is required for monitoring. Below we define the event 
structure for our proposed monitoring framework. 
 
1. Process level event 
processName 
eventLevel (processLevelEvent) 
eventName (Start or End) 
eventTime (Timestamp) 
Variable 0 . . . n – domain specific variables 
2. Activity level event 
processName 
activityName (name of the Service or User Task) 
eventLevel (activityLevelEvent) 
eventType (Service Task or User Task) 
eventName (Start or End) 
processFlow (used to construct a composition 
work-flow) 
eventTime (Timestamp) 
Variable 0 . . . n – domain specific variables 
eventDate (e.g., 2013/04/05) 
 
V. THE SECURITY POLICY MONITORING 
FRAMEWORK 
Our monitoring framework is a software module that runs in 
parallel to a BPMN process and observes its behavior by 
intercepting the events that are produced by the processes. The 
framework we describe is modular and allows a simple 
integration with other modules or platforms. The components of 
the monitoring framework are illustrated in Fig. 5 and a 
description of each of the monitoring units follows. 
A. Monitoring Policy 
A monitoring policy is a set of requirements, defined using 
the language ConSpec, which specifies what to monitor for a 
particular BPMN process. These requirements can be specified 
by a service provider as well as by a service consumer 
(depending on the contract specification process).  
B.  Monitoring Rule Repository 
It is a database of monitoring rules used for monitoring 
services. The rules defined in the monitoring policy are 
translated into monitoring rules by the monitoring module and 
are stored in the Monitoring rule repository. An example of a 
monitoring rule might specify that the trust value of a service 
should be continuously monitored so that a notification is 
generated as soon as the value falls below a given threshold. 
C. Event Manager 
This module gathers the events coming from the runtime 
environment (running the BPMN processes) and passes them to 
the Analyzer. The event manager is composed of an Event Filter 
that filters relevant events for compliance monitoring. The Event 
Filter relies on a filtering mechanism and acts as a first step to 
reduce the number of events that must be considered by the 
Analyzer. 
D. Analyzer 
Upon receiving events from the Event Manager, the 
Analyzer analyses them by accessing rules from the repository. 
It uses the monitoring policy to select the appropriate monitoring 
rules for a particular process. 
Every policy is analyzed according to the ConSpec 
specification. In particular, if a policy has a Scope “Session” the 
policy is initialized when a service is invoked. For “Multi-
Session” policies the initialization is performed when the service 
is added/registered in the platform. On the level of ConSpec 
initialization, it means that we start with the q0 state, assigning 
initial values specified in the SECURITY STATE part of the rule to 
the set of declared parameters. 
The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is developed as a part of 
the Analyzer. The PDP helps in translating ConSpec policies 
into monitoring rules and decision making. It also uploads the 
initial values of global variables (i.e., specified in the Security 
State part of the policy) to the memory. 
Upon receiving events from the Analyzer, the PDP analyses 
them according to the order of the guard-update statements 
specified in the policy. The first guard returning “true” fires the 
corresponding update (i.e., actions, which have to be performed 
before continuing of the execution) and afterwards no more 
statements are checked. Thus, no conflicts are allowed to occur. 
Firing “true” means that we move from a previous state of the 
ConSpec automata to the state with the updated values of the 
considered parameters. 
If no guards resulted to “true” (and no updates for ELSE are 
specified), this means a violation of the policy, i.e., we try to 
make a transition which does not belong to the automata. If no 
updates are necessary for some conditions, a special command 
“skip” is envisaged. For example, a user might specify a policy 
(Fig. 16 in the Appendix section) to monitor the Map service 
for trustworthiness every time it is invoked. As BEFORE 
statement states, the property is updated before an activity starts 
and if the current activity is anyone but the one we would like 
to check the trustworthiness value of (“Payment” in the 
example) or the value is greater than the defined threshold (“90” 
in the example) nothing happens (skip command). The alarm is 
raised otherwise (i.e., when the “Payment” service has 
trustworthiness less than 90). Note that the property requires a 
special external function (i#TrustworthinessPrediction) to be 
invoked, which is supported by our framework subject to a 
proper declaration of the function in the initialization file prior 
to invocation. 
When the ConSpec policy is received by the monitoring 
module, the Analyzer stores the policy as rules in the repository 
(memory). When input (event) arrives, the PDP is invoked to 
change its state and make a decision based on the rules stored 
in the memory. In this example, if the event corresponds to the 
invocation of the Map Service, the PDP will be invoked to 
retrieve the trustworthiness value and check it against the 
threshold stored in the memory. If the current trustworthiness 
value falls below the threshold, a notification will be generated.  
 
The notification alerts are generally in the following format: 
alert("ServiceID", Type, Property); Where 
ServiceID= “ID of the service involved” 
Type=”the type of the notification i.e. Contract Violation” 
Property=”the security property agreed to be monitored in 
the agreed policy but the service failed to adhere i.e. separation 
of duty”. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Security Policy Monitoring Framework 
 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented the monitoring module as an 
independent service that can easily be integrated into different 
service frameworks. As an example, we integrated the 
monitoring module into the Aniketos platform [14], where it is 
a part of the Security Monitoring & Notification package. The 
modules are running in Karaf [24] as remote OSGI services. 
Thus, our monitoring framework is not just a part of the overall 
implementation of the project, but a stand-alone package, which 
can be easily used in different service composition frameworks 
such as [25] or [26], as long as its interfaces are respected. The 
only dependency on the Aniketos platform, which the 
monitoring package has, is verification of precise, non-pure 
ConSpec, properties (e.g., trustworthiness). On the other hand, 
our package contains a mechanism, which allows for 
development of a custom verification module and binding it with 
the monitoring capabilities. Thus, if one does not want to use the 
standard Aniketos trustworthiness module but still wants 
monitoring trustworthiness properties, he/she can use an 
alternative implementation with a properly defined interface.  
The source code for the monitoring module is available at 
GitHub [27]. 
As it has been discussed in Section V, the monitoring module 
(or Security Monitoring & Notification package, as a whole) 
requires ConSpec policies and the event of the running service 
as input and produces notifications as output. Next, we briefly 
describe the modules producing the input for a complete 
description of the implementation tested in this paper. 
 
  
Fig. 6: Service Composition Framework (SCF). 
 
In our implementation ConSpec policies are produced by the 
Service Composition Framework (SCF) using the integrated 
ConSpec editor. In general, the SCF (shown in Fig. 6) is an 
Eclipse-based environment which enables service designers to 
build executable composition plans and specify their monitoring 
policies using the ConSpec editor. It allows the modelling of 
service compositions in BPMN and their deployment to the 
process execution engine (Activiti engine [24]). The ConSpec 
properties can be specified by a service provider or a service 
consumer (depending on the contract specification process 
performed by SCF).  
 
 
 
Fig. 7: ConSpec Editor. 
 
We have created a ConSpec editor which provides a 
graphical user interface for making and changing ConSpec 
policies (Fig. 7). The tool also converts the policy to a specified 
XML format, which simplifies policy processing by the policy 
decision point (PDP) of the monitor (see Sec. 5). The tool checks 
the correctness of the written policy and notifies the writer about 
possible errors. 
A Service Runtime Environment (SRE) is responsible for the 
execution of services (with Activiti engine) and enforcing rules 
specified by the service designer. SRE interacts with the 
monitoring module and generates events for the running service 
that are then analyzed by the monitoring module in compliance 
with a contract (ConSpec rules). 
Finally, SRE is also responsible for handling the 
notifications generated by the monitoring module. A set of rules 
can be defined to handle these alarms. For each rule, the service 
designer can specify the constraints for the event to fire the rule 
and the action to be performed once the rule is fired. For 
example, an action could be a recomposition, from simply 
replacing a single service with another one performing the same 
task. The result of this action will be a different runnable 
composition plan satisfying the same security requirements as 
the substituted Web service. Fig. 8 shows the dialogue available 
into the Service Composition Framework to allow the definition 
of rules used by the SRE to manage the behavior of the 
composite service at runtime. For example, if the separation of 
duty requirement for both PointOfInterest service and the 
WeatherForecast service is violated, the specified rule will cause 
a re-composition by replacing the WeatherForcast service with 
another functionally similar service offered by a different 
provider. For more details about SRE and the Aniketos platform, 
in general, we refer the interested reader elsewhere [29].  
 
 
Fig. 8: Rule Editor. 
 
VII. DEMONSTRATION THROUGH INFOSERVICE 
In this section, we demonstrate our monitoring framework 
using the InfoService example (recall Sec. 2) that has been 
developed on the Aniketos platform. We consider the separation 
of duty and binding of duty security requirements for the 
demonstration below. 
The way the atomic services are composed for the 
InfoService (using the Service Composition Framework) is 
shown in Fig. 6. The service designer specifies the monitoring 
policy through the ConSpec editor and wants the following 
compliance and security requirements for the “information 
service” process: 
1. Separation of duty: Both the PointOfInterest service 
and the WeatherForecast service should be offered by different 
service providers. 
2. Binding of duty: The Map service and the 
WeatherForcast service should belong to the same service 
provider. 
       Before service deployment, it is setup that if at runtime the 
security requirements are not fulfilled then the composition has 
to be recomposed (with an editor shown in Fig. 6). Finally the 
composite service along with its monitoring policy is uploaded 
to the Service Runtime Environment (SRE). 
 
 
Fig. 9: Security policy for separation of duty. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: Security policy for binding of duty. 
 
After service deployment, the runtime environment forwards 
the monitoring policy to the monitoring module along with 
information about the service to monitor, i.e., Service ID. The 
monitoring policy is a zipped set of XML files, each of which 
contains one security policy written with the ConSpec language. 
In other words, a security policy is specified as ConSpec rules 
in the form of an XML file. These policies state the properties 
guaranteed by the composite service specification and stated as 
rules. Each security policy corresponds to a specific security 
property. For example, Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show two security 
policies for both the separation of duty and the binding of duty. 
Next to these two basic and widely used security properties, a 
custom policy could be devised with ConSpec. For instance, Fig. 
11, shows a custom policy that states that a user cannot invoke 
the same PointOfInterest service more than two times (rotating 
the providers should provide better privacy protection for the 
user). 
 
 
Fig. 11: Custom policy example. 
 
During the service execution, five Web Services are executed 
and events are compiled based on the event model discussed in 
Sec. 4. The events are then passed to the remote monitoring 
module for analysis as shown in Fig. 12. The Event Manager 
relies on a filtering mechanism and acts as a first step to reduce 
the number of events to be taken into account. Indeed, only 
events that are considered as relevant for a particular service 
which needs to be monitored are selected by the Event Manager. 
This selection has to be carried out according to a particular type 
of event, the existence of an attribute in an event or a particular 
value of an event attribute. 
 
 
Fig. 12: The events received by the monitoring module. 
 
The events are analyzed with the help of the ConSpec PDP 
(discussed in Sec. 5). The monitoring module analyses these 
events and triggers alerts to the Notification module in case of 
any policy violation. In our InfoService case study, both the 
PointOfInterest service and the WeatherForecast service are 
offered by the same service provider (violating the separation of 
duty requirement) and the Map service and the WeatherForcast 
service are provided by different service providers (violating the 
binding of duty requirement). This is done deliberately to check 
if the monitoring framework detects the violation of these 
security requirements. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13: Notification broker console. 
 
   While executing the InfoService process, the monitoring 
module successfully detected the violation of both the security 
requirements as shown in Fig. 13. The Notification broker 
console is developed as a part of the Notification module to 
monitor the alerts sent to the Notification module. According to 
the rule set at design time (in case of Separation of duty 
requirement), a recomposition is triggered and leads to the 
substitution of the WeatherForcast service with another 
WeatherForcast service offer by the provider other than the one 
who provides the PointOfInterest service. 
VIII. EVALUATION 
This section intends to evaluate how the monitoring module 
of the proposed framework behaves under high load and to 
pragmatically infer the number of services that can be monitored 
by one instance. The performance and scalability of the 
monitoring framework is mainly influenced by two factors: the 
complexity of the policy and the number of services being 
monitored. Our framework can easily scale horizontally: we can 
easily add as many instances of the monitoring module to ensure 
that each monitoring module needs only to monitor a 
“reasonable” number of services. Back to the main point, to 
evaluate how a single monitoring module behaves under high 
load and to practically infer how many services can be 
monitored by one instance, we used the The Grinder3, a Java-
based load testing distributed framework. We implemented a 
script for the load-testing platform that generated random 
service identifiers, loaded a set of security policies, and sent a 
pre-planned script of events to the compliance monitor. This was 
executed by eight threads for a period of approximately 70-
minutes. The logs produced during this test were then processed 
using The Grinder Analyzer4. 
                                                          
3
 http://grinder.sourceforge.net/ 
 
 
Fig. 14: Graph of transactions per-second (upper plot) and mean 
response times (lower plot) for the compliance monitor 
implementation. 
 
Fig. 14 shows the number of transactions processed per 
second by the compliance monitor whilst under load from eight 
clients. The number of transactions processed reflects (or at least 
gives a rough indication on) the complexity of the monitoring 
policy – the more transactions, the more complex policy, and 
vice versa. This graph shows that the compliance monitor is 
capable of handling heavy loads, responding for the majority of 
the tests between 300-340 transactions per second with response 
times that were generally under one-second. The anomaly that 
occurs approximately fifty-minutes into the test, shown in Fig. 
14, is caused by periodic garbage collection of many flyweight 
objects instantiated during the monitoring process and will be 
corrected for later releases. 
 
Table 1: Load-testing results 
 
 
Table. 1 provides a breakdown of the performance information 
by operation. The Web service interface of the compliance 
monitor implementation supports three operations: creating a 
monitor for a service and a set of security policies, destroying a 
monitor when it is no longer required, and processing an event 
generated by a service to verify its compliance to the policy. 
The operations to create and destroy monitors were invoked 
approximately 134,000 times during the load test, with the 
discrepancy between creating and destroying monitors 
explained by a combination of the 984 failed process event 
operations and the manual termination of the load-test after 
approximately 70-minutes.  Significantly more invocations were 
made to the process event operation, which in the overall 
majority of cases responded in less than one-second. This also 
includes a large number of events which were not in compliance 
4
 http://track.sourceforge.net/ 
with the monitoring policy in place. These events were ignored 
and did not cause any notifications to be generated.    
Out of the 984 failed tests, 500 customized tests were 
conducted where the processing event attributes were not in the 
correct order, or the values were incorrect. Thus, the monitoring 
module was not in a position to process them and resulted in 
failed process event operations. The remaining 484 of the 984 
failed tests were caused by the testing tool as it failed to process 
some events.  
To conclude, a single instance of the monitoring module is 
capable of monitoring many services in compliance with a pre-
defined security policy, and performs well even when the 
monitoring instance is under heavy load. The framework 
supports a rich collection of events and attributes that apply at 
the level of services within a service composition. 
IX. RELATED WORK 
The business operations of today’s enterprises are heavily 
influenced by the Business Process modeling of both internal 
and external business events. Data collected during the 
execution of business processes are used for identifying the key 
performance indicators (KPI) that enable the continuous 
monitoring and tracking of the process behavior and guarantee 
its correct execution. A number of approaches exist in the 
literature that focuses on how KPIs are modeled and transferred 
into events by a model-driven approach [30][31][32][33]. The 
work of Ly et al. [34] developed a framework comparing 
approaches for monitoring business process compliance based 
on a well-defined set of monitoring functionalities. They 
emphasize that existing approaches do not provide a solution 
that combines an expressive language with full compliance.  
SALMon [35] is a generic framework for monitoring the 
service-based system lifecycle. The framework is platform 
independent and flexible. It is able to translate a SLA (e.g., 
written with the WS-Agreement standard) to the specific type of 
document, called Monitoring Management Document, which is 
needed in order to configure the monitor. The measurements are 
provided to the platform with a push or pull method and the 
values are checked against the constraints specified in the SLA. 
In contrast to this work, our framework does not require a 
translation of rules (since monitoring uses the same ConSpec 
language) and is created to monitor complex policies (which 
require more complex logic), followed by checking the 
constraints for the values. Similar to SALMon, our framework 
is able to add new measurement functions without any 
modification of the engine, but by a simple declaration of a new 
measurement.  
In another work [36], the authors incorporated an Agreement 
Document Analysis (ADA) module into their framework. This 
module was aimed to provide an explanation to the monitored 
values. The rules for analysis are expressed as a Constraint 
Satisfaction Problem (CSP), so the authors require additional 
mapping, plus, the expressiveness of CSP rules is bound with 
the languages used for SLA definition. This allows the rules 
analyzed to be simple checks that the received values are within 
the defined limits (at least, the authors do not provide any more 
policies for analysis). The work of Calabro et al. [37] presents a 
framework for performance analysis and optimization of a 
business process expressed in BPMN. It concentrates on 
generating an event-based monitoring approach that relies on the 
collection and evaluation of time and cost-based parameters. 
Chen et al. [38] proposed a Web service runtime monitoring 
method based on a probe, which uses aspect-oriented 
programming (AOP) to realize the monitoring for Web service 
abnormalities, running time, reliability and availability. The 
monitoring mechanism involves capturing the information of 
services’ exceptions, execution time and status events by 
inserting an AOP monitoring probe in the original the Web 
service. The exceptions belong to the Java object, captured by 
the Java virtual machine once occurred in the running of Web 
service code. Wu et al. [39] proposed an AOP-based approach 
for identifying patterns in BPEL processes. They use a stateful 
aspect extension allowing the definition of behavior patterns that 
should be identified. If identified, different actions can be 
triggered. It also permits monitoring certain patterns by using 
history-based point-cuts. However, monitoring is limited to 
instances of a BPEL process. The work presented by Baresi et 
al. [40]; Haiteng and Zhiqing [41]; Wu et al. [39] is based on 
how to monitor dynamic service compositions (BPEL 
processes) with respect to contracts expressed via assertions on 
services. Assertions are specified with a special-purpose 
specification language called WSCoL (Web Service Constraint 
Language), for applying constraints (monitoring rules) on the 
service execution. In Haiteng and Zhiqing [41], the authors 
proposed a solution to the problem of monitoring Web service 
instances implemented using BPEL. The solution used a 
Monitoring Broker to access Web service runtime state 
information and calculates the Quality of Service (QoS) 
property values. The Monitoring Broker is devised with the 
support of aspect-oriented programming that separates the 
business logic of the Web service from its monitoring 
functionality. Barnawi et al. [42] presented a pattern-based 
process to embed compliance monitoring logic within the 
process definition. The approach targets BPMN based processes 
to monitor runtime-related aspects such as timing and resource 
assignment constraints. A compliance expert is needed to 
visually specify the compliance rules, which are then embedded 
within the definition of a business process. While there are a 
number of related techniques, we believe our framework is novel 
in its ability to monitor both atomic and composite services. It 
does not require assertions to define what has to be monitored 
using a proprietary language. Our framework performs 
compliance monitoring of complex security properties by using 
a non-intrusive AOP mechanism and has direct access to the 
service execution environment.  
Martín and Pimentel [43] proposed using security adaptation 
contracts, which can adapt service orchestration in a secure way. 
The authors use several specific constructs to express usual 
security requirements for services (derived from a number of 
Web service security standards, like WS-Security), check the 
process for possible violations and have the main focus on 
adaptation of the orchestration in order to avoid violation of 
contract terms. Ciancia et al. [44] extended the work with a 
richer specification language (CryptoCCS) and provided 
transformation from BPMN to this language. Instead, in our 
paper, we focus on monitoring of security properties, define how 
and where monitoring actions must be performed, and trigger 
the notification mechanism. Naturally, the adaptation of a 
service composition is one of the possible further steps, but this 
is not the main focus of this paper.  
The work presented by Alhamazani et al. [45] discussed 
several monitoring tools developed for the cloud computing 
environment. However, these tools have mainly focused on 
monitoring the low level aspects of resources deployed in the 
cloud (e.g., memory, CPU, disk) [42]. Our framework considers 
the monitoring and compliance of the high level and logical 
security aspects of the cloud computing business process 
without relying on any external monitoring component where 
the entire execution environment is mainly controlled by the 
cloud providers.  CloudWatch [46] is a monitoring service 
providing comprehensive monitoring for cloud resources and 
applications run by customers on Amazon Web Services 
(AWS). CloudWatch can collect and track metrics, collect and 
monitor log files, set alarms, and react to changes in AWS 
resources. Thus, Amazon CloudWatch is a useful monitoring 
solution for Amazon Cloud users; however, the way, in which 
monitoring data are gathered, collected and analyzed, is not 
transparent. Further, it is restricted to AWS products.  Nagios 
[47] is an open source-monitoring framework that allows 
monitoring of IT infrastructure to ensure proper functioning of 
systems, applications, and services.  It is designed to utilise a list 
of plug-ins that would be executed to monitor the target system. 
However, Aceto et al. [48] suggested that Nagios is not suitable 
for a rapidly changing dynamic infrastructure (i.e., SOA-based 
applications are highly dynamic and liable to change heavily at 
runtime) and is not suitable for as-is adoption in Cloud 
scenarios. Plugins in Nagios can be easily developed and 
leverage its flexibility in a way that could monitor virtually any 
type of network [49]. Our framework could be seamlessly 
integrated into Nagios as a plugin to perform the security 
monitoring of BPMN-based services in compliance with a 
predefined security policy written in ConSpec. 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a monitoring framework for SOA-based 
systems, which is particularly tailored for detecting security, 
privacy, and trustworthiness violations of service compositions. 
The monitoring framework ensures that the service behaves in 
compliance with a predefined security policy. The approach 
enables monitoring across multiple composite services, and 
integrates dynamic changes from various subsystems efficiently 
with high performance. This monitoring framework is, of 
course, only one building block of a holistic approach for the 
secure and trustworthy construction and execution of service 
compositions: while we did not discuss the related details in this 
paper, the presented monitoring framework was integrated into 
the Aniketos platform which supports the design-time and 
runtime aspects of secure and trustworthy service compositions. 
Nevertheless, it is implemented as a stand-alone package which 
can be applied in diverse service orchestrating platforms. 
Compared with other existing solutions, the monitoring 
framework presented here offers flexibility as well as 
applicability in the context of composite services. To achieve 
this, the platform supports a rich collection of events and 
attributes that apply at the level of services within a service 
composition. We demonstrated this using a real composite 
service invocation monitored against the user specified security 
policy. Our proposed monitoring framework provides a user 
friendly interface for service designers to specify their 
monitoring policies as ConSpec rules. A policy written in 
ConSpec is easily understandable by humans and the simplicity 
of the language allows a comparatively simple semantics. This 
enables the service designer to easily specify the monitoring 
requirements for their processes and monitor them using the 
framework. The novelty of our work stems from the way in 
which monitoring information can be combined from multiple 
dynamic services to automate the monitoring of business 
processes and proactively report compliance violations. 
Moreover, service users may specify their own properties (using 
ConSpec) and include them into the contract for monitoring. 
Generally, the service composition providers can subscribe to 
different Alerts through the Notification module. Alerts 
regarding policy violation are sent as notifications to those who 
subscribed them, enabling verification and decision making.   
We see several lines of future work to increase the 
applicability of our framework, including: 
1. To increase the usability, we are investigating high-
level notations (e.g., SecureBPMN [14][15]) for specifying the 
properties that need to be monitored. On the one hand, our 
monitoring framework is very flexible. On the other hand, it 
results in runtime overheads that can be reduced if certain 
properties can be guaranteed statically (e.g., based on a formal 
analysis at design-time) and hence excluded from the 
monitoring at runtime. We will investigate approaches that 
allow deciding, on a case-by-case basis, if a property of a given 
service composition should be validated statically or monitored 
at runtime. 
2. The violations of required properties should be not only 
detected but also reacted (pro-actively) by an execution 
framework for service compositions to minimize the overall 
number of violations as well as ensure the availability. Thus, we 
need to integrate techniques for dynamic service replacements 
and service re-composition that require explicit user consent or 
are completely hidden from the end users. 
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I. APPENDIX 
No Delegation policy can be devised as is it written in Fig.  
15. 
 
Figure 15: No Delegation policy. 
 
The same policy may be applied to all services in a hierarchy 
if the policy is defined with a template. For example, it is easy 
to see that in the Trustworthiness policy shown in Fig. 16, the 
two parameters that make it specific are: ServiceID and Value. 
Thus, it is enough to devise a ConSpec template that simply 
requires these two inputs. If we require all sub-services to have 
the same property, we should simply change the ServiceID 
parameter for all of them. This, however, is just a facilitating 
procedure for policy making, and it does not affect the 
monitoring features, since the property is to be defined as a 
standalone ConSpec rule in the end. We implement the template 
handling feature within our ConSpec Editor saving the results as 
a separate xml file. When a user would like to instantiate the 
policy, he/she are prompted for the required inputs and the editor 
forms the policy automatically. Moreover, our CSF is able to 
devise a policy per lower services in the hierarchy automatically, 
using a similar procedure. 
 
 
Figure 16: Trustworthiness 
 
